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Chapter 8
Childlessness in the United States
Tomas Frejka
8.1  Introduction
In recent decades, childlessness among women in the United States has attracted a 
considerable amount of attention in the professional literature, and is frequently 
discussed in newspapers and on radio and television talk shows. This does not come 
as a surprise, as the percentage of women who do not have any children by the end 
of their reproductive years doubled between the mid-1970s and the mid-2000s, 
from about 10 to 20 %. Since then, however, the share of women who remain child-
less has been declining: in 2010–2012, the share was around 15 % (Table 8.1).1 
While establishing the levels of and the trends in childlessness is relatively simple, 
determining the circumstances and reasons which lead women and couples to 
remain childless is more complex.
Three different sources of statistical data on childlessness are available in the 
U.S. This wealth of data is almost as much a curse as it is a blessing. However, using 
data from all three sources one can obtain a good approximate idea of the levels of 
and the trends in childlessness. Yet because each source provides somewhat differ-
ent data, it is difficult to determine which one most closely reflects reality. On bal-
ance the positive aspect of good approximate information prevails. Moreover, the 
overall perception provided by the three sources of data is consistent. Not only that. 
The available sources offer various types of information, including some kinds 
which are relatively rare. One of the sources contains a time series spanning an 
1 The levels of and trends in childlessness among women are based primarily on data from the 
Current Population Surveys in Table 8.1, which is generally corroborated by data from the cohort 
fertility tables (Fig. 8.2, 1970 cohort) and from the National Surveys of Family Growth (Table 8.2, 
latest years).
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entire century, which is also broken down by race. Another source provides data not 
only by race, but also for Hispanics. A third source contains data on whether women 
are temporarily, voluntarily, or non-voluntarily childless, as well as information 
about women’s personal characteristics and selected attitudes to work and family. 
These data are available for a span of close to four decades. Knowledge which can 
be gleaned from all three sources of data is likely to be expanded in the future.
Following this introduction, the sources of data are discussed. In Sect. 8.3 levels 
of and trends in childlessness are outlined. Section 8.4 deals with motivations and 
reasons for childlessness. Section 8.5 discusses trends and circumstances of black 
childlessness. The chapter concludes with an epilogue.
8.2  Sources of Data
The three sources of statistical data on childlessness are cohort fertility tables 
(National Center for Health Statistics of the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention), the biannual supplements on fertility of the Current Population Survey 
(Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor Statistics), and the National Survey of Family 
Growth (National Center for Health Statistics of the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention [NCHS]).
Table 8.1 Shares of childless women at ages 40–44, all, white, white non-Hispanic, black, and 
Hispanic women, 1976–2012, United States
Survey 
year
Percent of women childless
Effect of Hispanic on White 
childlessness (in % points)All White
White 
non-Hispanic Black Hispanic
1976 10.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1980 10.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1985 11.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1990 16.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1994 17.5 18.0 n.a. 14.3 13.0 n.a.
1995 17.5 18.1 n.a. 15.1 10.1 n.a.
1998 19.0 19.5 20.1 17.0 14.5 −0.6
2000 19.0 19.2 20.3 17.7 10.9 −1.1
2002 17.9 17.9 18.5 19.2 13.1 −0.6
2004 19.3 19.1 20.0 21.3 13.8 −0.9
2006 20.4 21.2 22.5 16.4 14.4 −1.3
2008 17.8 18.0 17.9 18.0 18.9 0.1
2010 18.8 19.1 20.6 17.2 12.4 −1.5
2012 15.1 15.3 16.4 15.4 10.9 −1.1




8.2.1  The Cohort Fertility Tables
The Cohort Fertility Tables consist of two sets. The first set is based on recorded 
period fertility data for the years 1917–1973, and was prepared by Robert L. Heuser 
(1976). It provides information on childbearing of complete and incomplete birth 
cohorts of 1868–1959. The second set uses period data for 1960–2005, and was 
prepared by Brady E. Hamilton in collaboration with Candace M. Cosgrove (2010). 
Hamilton and Cosgrove updated this set with period fertility data for 2006–2009. It 
provides information on childbearing of complete and incomplete birth cohorts of 
1911–1995. The Heuser tables can be linked with the Hamilton and Cosgrove tables 
to create a series of data on childlessness for 93 consecutive birth cohorts.
8.2.2  The Fertility Supplement of the Current Population 
Survey
The Fertility Supplement of the Current Population Survey is one of 20 supple-
ments sometimes included in the Current Population Survey (CPS), a monthly sur-
vey of households conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau for the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. The CPS collects and maintains a comprehensive body of labor force 
data, including information on employment, unemployment, hours of work, earn-
ings, and other demographic and labor force characteristics. The periodic fertility 
supplement provides data on the number of children women aged 15–50 have ever 
had, and their characteristics. It is usually conducted every 2 years, but the intervals 
have varied from 1 to 4 years (see Table 8.1 and Fig. 8.3). Since the mid-1990s data 
on the U.S. Hispanic population2 have been provided (Bachu 1995).
8.2.3  The National Survey of Family Growth
The National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG) gathers information on family life, 
marriage and divorce, pregnancy, infertility, use of contraception, and men’s and 
women’s health; i.e. data on fertility and on the intermediate factors that explain 
fertility. The NSFG was conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics 
(NCHS) in 1973, 1976, 1982, 1988, 1995, and 2002. The most recent NSFG cov-
ered the years 2006–2010 (Martinez et al. 2012). In these surveys childless women 
2 The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines Hispanic or Latino as “a person of Cuban, 
Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central American, or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless 
of race.” In data collection and presentation, federal agencies are required to use a minimum of two 
ethnicities: “Hispanic or Latino” and “Not Hispanic or Latino.”
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are comprised of three categories defined as follows (Abma and Martinez 2006; 
Martinez et al. 2012):
Temporarily Childless women are those who have not had any live births and 
expect a birth in the future.
Involuntarily Childless women are those with a fecundity impairment who 
reported to be sterile for non-contraceptive reasons; subfecund, i.e. they reported 
difficulty conceiving or delivering a baby or difficulty for partner to father a baby; 
or a doctor advised the woman never to become pregnant because of a medical dan-
ger to her, her fetus or both; married or cohabiting women that have had a 3 year 
period of unprotected sexual intercourse with no pregnancy.
Voluntarily Childless women are those who do not expect to have any children, 
and are either fecund or surgically sterile for contraceptive reasons.
Note that the cohort fertility tables are based on data from administrative birth 
records, whereas the other two data sources are based on sample surveys. The sam-
ple surveys provide information on the characteristics of mothers and their children 
which are not available in birth records. However, the estimates of common 
 measures based on the sample surveys are not precisely the same as those based on 
administrative birth records.
8.3  Levels of and Trends in Childlessness
8.3.1  Cohort Fertility Tables
In any given birth cohort, the youngest women bear few children. With each passing 
year, these women will have borne more children, and the share of women who 
remain childless declines. To ensure the comparability of the rates of childlessness 
between cohorts, the data on the proportion of childless women at the end of their 
childbearing years are assembled for each cohort. Figure 8.1 depicts the shares of 
all U.S. childless women, and of white and black women at age 50 in the Heuser 
(1976) and in the Hamilton and Cosgrove (2010) cohort fertility tables.
Among the 40 cohorts born between the late 1860s and the early 1910s, around 
20 % of white women remained childless. Women who lived through the main years 
of their childbearing period during the core years of the historic economic depres-
sion of the 1930s—cohorts born between 1906 and 1911—experienced relatively 
high rates of childlessness, about 21 %. However, this was not dramatically more 
than most of the preceding 40 cohorts. A rapid decline in the share of childless 
women started with the 1913 birth cohort and lasted through the 1925 cohort that 
reached a childless rate of 9 %. A low share of childlessness among white women 
fluctuating between 8 and 10 % was retained for almost 20 cohorts from the 1925 
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through the 1943 birth cohort. A pronounced increase in the shares of childless 
women ensued, from 10 % among the 1943 cohort to 18 % among the 1953 cohort. 
The childless rate at age 50 was close to 18 % for a few cohorts and then started to 
decline to around 17 % in the 1959 and 1960 cohorts (Fig. 8.1).
The long-term trends in the shares of childless black women differed from those 
of white women. For about 60 cohorts, starting with those of the mid-1880s through 
those of the mid-1940s, black women experienced higher rates of childlessness than 
white women. Notably, almost one-third of black women who were in their most 
fertile years during the Great Depression of the 1930s remained childless. With a 
time lag of about five cohorts shares of childless black women declined from 29 % 
among women born in 1916 for more than 30 cohorts to a low of 6 % in the 1948 
birth cohort. Thereafter, the share of childless black women increased reaching a 
share of 11 % in the 1960 cohort (Fig. 8.1).
Although numbers of births after age 40 have increased in recent years (Sobotka 
2009), these still tend to be relatively small. Consequently, trends in the shares of 
childless women at age 40 are essentially the same as trends in the shares of child-
less women at age 50 (Fig. 8.2). Thus the delineation of trends can be extended for 
10 additional cohorts, namely for U.S. women trends of childless women can be 
obtained by observing trends of shares at age 40 for the 1960s birth cohorts. These 
women concluded their childbearing during the 2010s, and their principal period of 













Fig. 8.1 Shares of childless women at age 50, all, white and black women, birth cohorts 1867–
1960, United States (Sources: Heuser (1976); Hamilton and Cosgrove (2010))
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Among white women the declining trend of childless women extended into the 
1960s cohorts. The share of childless women in the 1960 birth cohort at age 40 was 
17.7 % and declined to 14.6 % in the 1970 birth cohort (Fig. 8.2). This implies that 
around 13 % of white women in the 1970 cohort will be childless at age 50. The 
rising trend in childlessness among black women of the 1950s cohorts stalled among 
the 1960s cohorts. The share of women who were childless at age 40 was 11.9 % 
among the 1960 birth cohort, and 12.1 % among the 1970 birth cohort (Fig. 8.2). 
This implies that around 11 % of black women in the 1970 cohort will be 
childless.
It appears that shares of white and black childless women in the 1970 cohort will 
be quite similar. The difference in the shares of white and black childless women in 
the 1950 cohort at age 40 was 10.2 percentage points which declined to 5.8 points 
in the 1960 cohort and to 2.5 points in the 1970 birth cohort.
Levels and trends of overall shares of childless women follow the levels and 
trends of white women quite closely. This is not surprising, as the majority of the 
U.S. population was and still is white, although the percentage of whites has been 
declining. In 1900 about 88 % of the U.S. population was white and 12 % was black 
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975). These percentages were essentially maintained 
through 1970. As of 2000, whites comprised about 82 % and blacks 13 % of the 
population (U.S. Census Bureau 2012). The effect of black childlessness on the 
overall levels and trends is nonetheless discernable. When black childlessness is 













Fig. 8.2 Shares of childless women at age 40 (in per cent), all, white and black women, birth 
cohorts 1877–1970, United States (Sources: Heuser (1976); Hamilton and Cosgrove (2010))
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The share of all childless women at age 50 in the 1960 cohort was 15.5 % and at 
age 40–16.5 %, a difference of exactly 1.0 percentage point. The share of all child-
less women at age 40 in the 1970 cohort was 13.8 %. Thus it is virtually assured that 
the overall share of childless women in the 1970 cohort at age 50 will be below 
13 %, because the difference in the 10 years younger cohort was 1.0 percentage 
point and this difference of childlessness between ages 40 and 50 in a particular 
birth cohort was growing.
8.3.2  Fertility Supplements of the Current Population Survey
In the fertility supplements of the Current Population Surveys parity distributions—
and thus also the shares of childless women—are provided for 5-year age groups. 
Until recently the oldest age group for whom these data were available was 40–44. 
Since 2012 the age group 45–50 has been added. Table 8.1 and Fig. 8.3 are based on 
data for the 40–44 age group. Although childbearing does not end at age 44, this cut 
off was necessary to obtain long-term time series.
According to these data the average share of all childless women aged 40–44 in 
the United States increased from 10 % around 1980 to almost 20 % in the 2000s, i.e. 
the proportion of childless women increased almost twofold within 20 years. 











Fig. 8.3 Shares of childless women ages 40–44, white, black, and Hispanic women, 1976–2012, 
United States (Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey for selected years, June 
1976 to June 2012)
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In the mid-1990s the shares of white childless women were almost 10 % higher than 
those of black women. By 2008–2012 the differences between white and black 
women in the rates of childlessness had diminished (Fig. 8.3 and Table 8.1).
When comparing childlessness of Hispanic women with childlessness among 
white and black women one has to keep in mind that in U.S. statistics Hispanics are 
included in the categories of “white” and “black.” Hispanics are considered an eth-
nic minority, not a race. It is nonetheless possible to get an idea of the effect of 
Hispanic childlessness on overall levels of childlessness of the race categories. Even 
though the Hispanic childlessness rate (5th numerical column in Table 8.1) is on 
average about 30 % lower than childlessness of non-Hispanic white women (3rd 
col.), the difference between the shares of all white childless women (2nd col. which 
includes white Hispanic women) and non-Hispanic white women is relatively small, 
on average this difference is only 0.9 percentage points (last col. in Table 8.1). The 
reason for such a small difference is that in 2010, for instance, Hispanic women 
constituted only about 18 % of white women, although the share of Hispanics in the 
population was increasing (U.S. Census Bureau 2011: Table 6). The effect of 
Hispanic black childlessness on total black childlessness was even smaller as the 
proportion of Hispanics among blacks was only about 5 % in 2010.
8.3.3  The National Surveys of Family Growth (NSFG)
Shares of childless women ages 40–44 rose from 7 % in the 1973–1976 rounds to 
18 % in the 1995 round of the NSFG. In the rounds conducted during the 2000s, the 
shares of childless women had settled at 15 % (Table 8.2 and Fig. 8.4). Among 
childless women ages 40–44 the smallest shares were experienced by the temporar-
ily childless. If the measurements had been taken at the end of women’s reproduc-
tive period, as was done in the cohort fertility tables, there would not be any 
temporarily childless women. As women ages 40–44 is the oldest category that can 
be analyzed, the temporarily childless women have a significant impact on the over-
all trends in childlessness. Since women are postponing births to higher ages, a 
larger amount of births are borne by older women; thus, an increasing proportion of 
women in the 40–44 age group still expect to bear children. While the share of tem-
porarily childless older women has been increasing steadily, it still represents only 
3 % of all women and around one-fifth of all childless women. The share of all 
women who are involuntarily childless has been relatively stable at an average of 
5 %. In the 1973–1976 rounds, the share of involuntarily childless women as a pro-
portion of all childless women was 60 % because the overall numbers of childless 
women were relatively small. In the latest rounds, about one-third of childless 
women would probably want to have children, but for one reason or another—pri-
marily related to a health issue—they have been unable to achieve this goal.
The NSFG definitions used to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary 
childlessness appear to be straightforward and clear (see Sect. 8.2.3 above). 
However, scholars have pointed out that an unknown segment of the women who at 
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Table 8.2 Women aged 40–44 and their childless status, National Survey of Family Growth, in 
per cent, United States
All women 1973–1976 1982 1988 1995 2002 2006–2010
One or more children 93 88 86 82 85 85
Childless 7 12 14 18 15 15
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
All women 1973–1976 1982 1988 1995 2002 2006–2010
One or more children 93 88 86 82 85 85
Voluntarily childless 2 5 8 10 6 8
Involuntarily childless 4 4 5 5 6 5
Temporarily childless 1 1 1 3 2 3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Childless women 1973–1976 1982 1988 1995 2002 2006–2010
Voluntarily 31 53 55 59 44 49
Involuntarily 60 38 36 26 40 30
Temporarily 9 9 10 16 16 21
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Sources: Abma and Martinez (2006), Martinez et al (2012), Mosher and Bachrach (1982), author’s 
calculations

















Fig. 8.4 Percent distribution of childless women aged 40–44 by childless status, National Survey 
of Family Growth, United States (Sources: Abma and Martinez (2006); Martinez et al (2012); 
Mosher and Bachrach (1982), author’s calculations)
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the end of their reproductive period report being voluntarily childless or having 
become involuntarily childless were postponing childbearing for various reasons 
until it became too late for them to bear children (Rindfuss et al. 1988: throughout). 
In other words, some, possibly many, women wind up being unintentionally child-
less as a result of having postponed childbearing. Regardless of how the childless-
ness occurred, using NSFG definitions, the percentage of the voluntarily childless 
increased from one-third in the 1970s rounds to approximately one-half of childless 
women in subsequent rounds (Table 8.2).
8.3.4  Personal Characteristics and Attitudes of Childless 
Women
There is ample evidence from several rounds of the NSFG that childless women, 
and particularly the voluntarily childless, are disproportionately white, are employed 
full-time, and have a higher education; and are less likely to be currently or formerly 
married and are less religious (Abma and Martinez 2006). For example, data from 
the 2002 round show that among women aged 35–44, 69 % of the voluntarily child-
less had some college or higher education, compared to 17 % among all women of 
that age; 76 % of the voluntarily childless were working full-time, compared to 51 % 
among all women; 79 % were non-Hispanic white, compared to 71 % among all 
women; and 35 % never attended religious services, compared to 17 % among all 
women (Abma and Martinez 2006).
Among the women aged 35–44, the voluntarily childless also differed from the 
temporarily and involuntarily childless in terms of economic characteristics. They 
had the highest individual and family incomes, the most extensive past work experi-
ence, and were the most likely to be employed in professional and managerial occu-
pations. For example, according to the results of the 1995 round, 57 % of the 
voluntarily childless had individual annual earnings of over US$25,000, compared 
to 41 % of the temporarily childless and 36 % of the involuntarily childless; and 
84 % had worked more than 15 years, compared with 72 % of the temporarily child-
less and 77 % of the involuntarily childless (Abma and Martinez 2006).
On the whole, the voluntarily childless tend to differ from women who have 
children and from the temporarily or the involuntarily childless in terms of their 
attitudes regarding gender egalitarianism, work, and family. For example, in their 
responses to questions in the 1995 round, 82 % of voluntarily childless versus 72 % 
of women with children disagreed with the statement “a man can make long-range 
plans, a woman cannot;” and 84 % of the voluntarily childless versus 75 % of the 
women with children agreed with the statement “young girls are entitled to as much 
independence as boys.” The voluntarily childless also stood out in their response to 
the question of whether “women are happier if they stay at home and take care of 
their children;” 87 % of them disagreed, compared with around 76 % of the women 




8.4  Reasons and Motivations for Remaining Childless
In a discussion of the biological factors which contribute to childbearing motiva-
tions, Foster (2000: 227) argued that because of their genetic predisposition to nur-
ture and the effects of hormones, “most women, motivated by a genetically 
developed desire to nurture, will choose to have at least one child, given reasonably 
favorable circumstances.” Moreover, McQuillan et al. (2008: 17) established that 
motherhood is valued by mothers and non-mothers alike, and that “there is no evi-
dence that valuing motherhood is in conflict with valuing work success among non- 
mothers, and among mothers the association is positive.” Yet for prolonged periods 
a fifth of U.S. women, i.e. around 20 %, remained childless. Why?
In the first place about 5 % of women cannot or should not bear children; they are 
involuntarily childless, mostly due to fecundity impairments or health issues 
(Fig. 8.4 and Table 8.2). Then there are the temporarily childless, i.e. those that are 
still expecting to have a child. However, these women can no longer be considered 
temporarily childless once they have reached the end of their childbearing period. 
The remainder of women remains childless for a wide variety of reasons.
People grow up and live in differing social, cultural, and economic circumstances 
which influence their decisions regarding childbearing. They live aided or obstructed 
by a material world, and are affected by an array of social norms. They may also 
have their own independent reasons for not having children. Both the material con-
ditions and the norms affecting their decisions may change over time. If we were to 
accept the notion that every woman has a natural desire to have children, irrespec-
tive of her surroundings, there would not be any voluntary childlessness. Indeed, 
there was a time in U.S. history when only around 8 % of white women and only 
about 5 to 6 % of black women were childless. Among these women, the rates of 
voluntary childlessness must have been negligible. The 1973–1976 round of the 
NSFG found that only 2 % of women reported being voluntarily childless, which 
implies that this share might have been even lower during the 1960s among white 
women. Moreover, the 5–6 % rate of childlessness among black women leaves very 
little room for voluntary childlessness. On the other hand, as was pointed out above, 
at certain points in time around 20 % of white women and almost 30 % of black 
women were childless, which implies that the shares of “voluntary” childlessness 
were large.
The basic explanation for these extreme high and low childlessness rates is the 
fact that the former occurred at a time of economic hardship and psychological 
stress for large strata of the population affecting family life during the Great 
Depression which started in 1929 and lasted through the early to mid-1930s. 
Conversely, the low childlessness rates occurred when a majority of the population 
experienced favorable economic and social conditions for childbearing after the 
Second World War. In his recently published book, Labor’s Love lost: The Rise and 
Fall of the Working-Class Family in America, Cherlin (2014) masterfully describes 
in great detail changes in American family life over the past two centuries. He char-
acterizes “the Great Depression [as] a cataclysmic event in the United States in its 
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depth and duration” (Cherlin 2014: 60). Based on contemporary sociological 
research of Komarovsky (1940), Cherlin discusses the effect of the Depression, 
inter alia, on reproductive behavior.
Their sex lives often deteriorated: in twenty-two out of thirty-eight families for which ade-
quate information was collected, the frequency of sexual relations declined--including four 
families in which sex stopped altogether. In some cases, however, couples reduced sexual 
activity not because of emotional strain but in order to lower the chance that the wife would 
become pregnant. Without modern means of birth control such as the pill or the IUD, finan-
cially struggling couples did what they could to avoid having another mouth to feed. One 
parent said, “It is a crime for children to be born when the parents haven’t got enough 
money to have them properly” (Cherlin 2014: 79).
The low shares of childlessness make clear sense in light of Cherlin’s characteriza-
tion of the living conditions of American families in the post-World War II years.
Why did young couples have so many children? One reason lay in the unique life histories 
of the generation who were in their twenties and thirties. They experienced the Great 
Depression as children or adolescents and then a world war erupted as they reached adult-
hood. After enduring these two cataclysmic events, the “great generation,” as they are 
sometimes called, was pleased in peacetime to turn inward toward home and family. … 
Family life was the domain in which they found … security. Raising children provided a 
sense of purpose to adults who had seen how fragile the social world could be. … Moreover, 
conditions were favorable for family formation and fertility: unemployment rates were low, 
wages were rising, and the government had enacted the GI Bill, which offered low-interest 
home mortgage loans to veterans so that they could buy single-family homes. … Employers 
in the rapidly expanding American economy were forced to offer higher wages in order to 
attract new workers because they were in short supply (Cherlin 2014:115).
What remains to be clarified are the social, cultural, and economic circumstances 
shaping childlessness levels and trends prior to the Great Depression of the 1930s 
and the levels and trends unfolding during the two to three last decades of the twen-
tieth century, as well as the peak and subsequent decline in childlessness in the early 
twenty-first century.
It could be considered odd that for 40 years (or 40 birth cohorts, i.e. 1867–1907) 
childlessness was at a similar level as during the Great Depression (Fig. 8.1). 
Morgan (1991) has argued that the period of high childlessness in late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries was mainly due to a strong motivation to delay mar-
riage and childbearing, which eventually resulted in many women remaining child-
less, even though that was not their initial intention. Childbearing delays were 
significantly more pronounced in the economically more advanced states of the 
northeast. Many young women working in mills “may have been important income 
earners. Pressure for them to marry may have been replaced by pressure to continue 
supporting the family” (Morgan 1991: 801). Furthermore, the harsh conditions of 
the economic depression of the 1890s might have had an impact similar to that of 
the Great Depression of the 1930s, even though it was not as long or as deep. In 
addition, the risk of remaining childless would have been greater when childbearing 
was delayed, as sub-fecundity and sterility increases among women in their thirties. 
Finally, growing numbers of women were entering professions during this period, 
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and these women tended not to marry; or, if they married, they often remained 
childless.
Turning our attention to the end of the twentieth century and the early twenty- 
first century, numerous societal developments have been taking place simultane-
ously, each of which has played a role in shaping contemporary childbearing 
behavior, and has thus contributed to trends in childlessness. These include:
• The re-emergence of marriage and childbearing postponement (Kohler et al. 
2002; Hašková 2007; Goldstein et al. 2009; Frejka 2011)
• Rising female labor force participation rates, which are now almost as high as 
those of men (Oppenheimer 1994; Bianchi 2011)
• The work-family dilemma for employed women (Bianchi 2011)
• The status of the childcare infrastructure (Laughlin 2013)
• The increase in women’s earnings, and the growth in their income relative to that 
of men (Cherlin 2014: 126; Wang et al. 2013)
• The growing empowerment of women (Anonymous 2009)
• High rates of incarceration (Tsai and Scommenga 2012)
• The deployment of men and women in wars (Adams 2013)
• Technological developments in production and communication, and their impact 
on the composition of the work force (Karoly and Panis 2004; Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2014)
• The hollowing out of the work force (Cherlin 2014: 124–125)
• Changes in the class structure of society, with education playing the decisive role 
(Cherlin 2014)
• Growing job insecurity, particularly among the less educated (Farber 2010)
• Changing marriage and cohabitation patterns (Cherlin 2009)
• Changing income and wealth distribution patterns (Saez and Zucman 2014)
• Income stagnation among a large share of the population (Krugman 2007; Fry 
and Kochhar 2014)
The above developments may influence women and their partners—in various 
ways, at different stages, and to differing degrees—in their inadvertent or conscious 
deliberations about whether to remain childless.
On the other hand there are those, including professionals such as psychologists 
and physicians, who have argued that some women and men decide to remain child-
less for their own subjective reasons. These individuals presumably engage in an 
independent decision-making process in which they focus on their personal motiva-
tions and preferences, rather than allowing themselves to be influenced by their 
circumstances. Scott (2009: 75–110; 222) reported the results of a survey of 
 childless individuals which found that the six most compelling motivation state-
ments for not having children were:
• I love our life, our relationship, as it is, and having a child won't enhance it.
• I value freedom and independence.
• I do not want to take on the responsibility of raising a child.
• I have no desire to have a child, no maternal/paternal instinct.
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• I want to accomplish/experience things in life that would be difficult to do if I 
was a parent.
• I want to focus my time and energy on my own interests, needs, or goals.
Taking into account the wide range of circumstances and personal subjective rea-
sons which can affect people’s decisions about whether to have children can help us 
to better understand the increase in the share of women who remained childless 
which occurred during the final decades of the twentieth century and into the 
twenty-first century. However, the reasons for the apparent reversal in this trend in 
the early years of the twenty-first century have yet to be explored. That is a topic for 
discussion and research in the near future, especially if this trend continues.
8.5  Black Childlessness: Trends and Explanations
For almost 60 birth cohorts (1883–1942) childlessness was higher among black 
than among white women (Fig. 8.1). At its peak black childlessness was 2.4 times 
higher than it was among white women – in the 1924 and 1925 birth cohorts. 
Starting with the cohorts born in the early 1940s, this trend was reversed, and black 
women became less likely than white women to be childless. Among the youngest 
cohorts, those born in the late 1950s and the 1960s, the shares of black and of white 
Americans who are childless are converging at around 12–15 % (Figs. 8.1 and 8.2). 
The relatively low childlessness among black women and the convergence with 
white childlessness since the end of the twentieth century is generally confirmed by 
data from the Fertility Supplements of the Current Population Survey as well as the 
National Surveys of Family Growth.
The basic reasons for high black childlessness were analogous to those shaping 
white childlessness, namely difficult economic and social settings, psychological 
stress and social norms. In addition, living conditions of black Americans were 
incomparably more difficult than those of whites. Racial segregation, discrimina-
tion, and inequalities have been basic features of American society throughout its 
history (Massey 2011), and are reflected in virtually all aspects of life, such as eco-
nomic opportunities, remuneration, schooling, housing, and access to health and 
reproductive services.
Farley (1970: 217–226) was the first to analyze deteriorating health conditions of 
blacks systematically, and their effect on reproductive behavior during the first three 
decades of the twentieth century. An increase in the prevalence of venereal diseases, 
such as syphilis and gonorrhea may have been an important factor generating the 
fertility decline and the increase in childlessness among blacks, which culminated 
in the 1930s. Farley was criticized by McFalls (1973: 18) and others who argued in 
favor of “a more conservative interpretation of the importance of VD in the natality 
history of the black population.” Yet McFalls (1973: 18) conceded that “health fac-
tors undoubtedly played a more significant role” than other societal factors.
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But what explains the decline in black childlessness and the crossover from rela-
tively high to relatively low levels of childlessness from the 1941 to the 1942 birth 
cohorts? The decline in the childlessness rate of black women started with the 
cohorts most affected by the Great Depression, namely those born around 1915, and 
lasted until the 1948 cohort, from a share of 30 % to 6 % (Figs. 8.1 and 8.2). The 
childlessness decline among blacks took more than twice as long as that for white 
women, 33 compared to 14 cohorts. The childlessness descent for white women 
also started with the cohorts most affected by the depression of the 1930s, but 
stopped when living conditions started to improve significantly after the Second 
World War and essentially settled at that level for over 20 birth cohorts. Among 
black women childlessness stopped declining temporarily for a few birth cohorts – 
those born between 1926 and 1931 – but then resumed its decline with new force. 
Black childlessness declined from 20 % in the 1931 cohort to 6 % in the 1948 cohort.
The passage of the Social Security Act in 1935 strengthened government support 
for health activities (Farley 1970: 230–235). Title VI of that act appropriated money 
“for the purpose of assisting States, counties…. in establishing and maintaining 
adequate public health service, including the training of personnel for State and 
local health work…” This was an important element in the development of the 
health system. The resulting improvements in the health of the black population in 
turn led to declines in childlessness.
Moreover, there may be some justification to assume that improvements in living 
conditions and educational attainment levels among the black population during the 
second half of the twentieth century were associated with the long-term decline in 
childlessness. This progress was both absolute as well as relative to that of the white 
population. While living conditions for blacks remained inferior to those of whites, 
the disparities were narrowing as blacks were catching up. On average, incomes of 
blacks were rising faster than those of whites, especially during the 1990s (Fig. 8.5). 
Rates of poverty among blacks were also improving. Based on the definition of 
poverty of the U.S. Census Bureau, the ratio of blacks to whites who were living in 
poverty declined from 3.4 in 1970 to 2.1 in 2010 (DeNavas-Walt et al. 2012: Table 
B-1). In addition, educational attainment levels of blacks were increasing faster than 
those of whites. Between 1960 and 2009, the shares of blacks aged 25 and older 
who had graduated from high school rose from 20.1 to 84.1 %, whereas the corre-
sponding shares of whites increased from 43.2 to 87.1 % (U.S. Census Bureau 2012: 
Table 225). Over the same period, the shares of blacks aged 25 and older who had 
graduated from college grew from 3.1 to 19.3 %, while the corresponding shares of 
whites increased from 8.1 to 29.9 % (U.S. Census Bureau 2012: Table 225).
What might be the reasons for the most recent turnaround – the doubling in black 
childlessness from 6 % in the 1948 birth cohort to 12 % in the 1968 cohort? The 
numerous societal developments shaping childlessness that have been taking place 
around the turn of the century listed above, together with the subjective motivations 
of women for not having children, surely played a role in influencing contemporary 
childbearing behavior and thus contributed to the increase in childlessness of black 
women.
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Other important factors which might have influenced the recent rise in black 
childlessness are changes in union formation and marital trends, and in fertility 
trends within unions. According to Cherlin (2009: 169), “the larger story for African 
Americans is a sharp decline in marriage that is far greater than among other 
groups.” In 2010 the share of black married women over age 18 was a mere 31 % 
compared to 61 % in 1960. In contrast, among white women this share declined 
from 74 to 55 % (Cohn et al. 2011). These developments are in line with the findings 
of Espenshade (1985: 209), who concluded that “at least since 1960 in the United 
States, a weakening of marriage has been under way. The fading centrality of mar-
riage in the lives of American men and women is more noticeable for blacks than 
for whites.” Only 24 % of black women aged 15–44 were married compared with 
46 % of white non-Hispanic women according to the NSFG 2006–2010 round 
(Copen et al 2012: 12).
A comprehensive, albeit complex, set of explanations for declining marriage 
rates among blacks has been revealed by research conducted by Banks (2011). Most 
black women want to marry and have children, as getting married is seen as a marker 
of status and social prestige, and remains an aspiration. Almost all black women 


































































Fig. 8.5 Households by total money income (in 1000 of constant 2008 U.S. dollars) and race of 




marry black men, and rarely marry across racial lines. In the African American 
community, however, there is a considerable shortage of successful black men who 
are educated, employed, and have respectful earnings. One reason for this shortfall 
is the extraordinarily high rate of incarceration of black men (Massey 2011:10; Tsai 
and Scommenga 2012). Second, black men are up to three times more likely than 
black women to marry a person of a different race. Third, at all educational levels 
men’s attendance and attainment rates are far below those of women. In these cir-
cumstances, many black women remain single or marry less educated black men. In 
such unions, women tend to be better educated and earn more money than their 
spouse, which can result in tensions over gender roles. Such marriages have a high 
potential to dissolve. Hence a high divorce rate among blacks is another reason why 
their marriage rates are low.
Data on trends in the types of first unions for women aged 15–44 confirm the 
decline in percentages of women who are married. Shares of marriages in first 
unions declined from 25.2 % in 1995 to 12.5 % in the 2006–2010 round of the 
National Survey of Family Growth (Table 8.3). Over the same period, the share of 
unions which were cohabitations increased from 35.4 to 49.2 %. Consequently, the 
percentages of black women of reproductive age who were not in any union hardly 
changed between the 1995 and the 2006–2010 NSFG rounds, i.e. instead of getting 
married a large share of black women were living in a consensual union. That 
implies that the recent increase in childlessness of black women does not appear to 
be associated with a decline in the percentage of women who are in a union. The 
combined shares of cohabiting and married women were 60.6 and 61.7 % in 1995 
and 2006–2010, respectively.
What did change dramatically between 1995 and 2013 was the fertility rate of 
unmarried black women; it declined by 17 %, from 74.5 to 61.7 births per 1000 
unmarried black women (Table 8.4). It was this significant decline in the fertility 
rate which was associated with the rise in black childlessness between the 1948 and 
the 1968 birth cohorts (Fig. 8.2). It is worth noting that the fertility rate of unmarried 
black women was almost twice the rate of unmarried white non-Hispanic women. 
Nonetheless, the decline in black fertility, overall and especially of unmarried – 
Table 8.3 Type of first unions, women ages 15–44, United States
Year No union Cohabitation Marriage Total
1995 39.4 35.4 25.2 100
2006–2010 38.4 49.2 12.5 100
Source: Copen et al. (2013) and Martin et al. (2015)
Table 8.4 Births per 1000 women ages 15–44, by race, United States
Year All black women Black unmarried women White non-Hispanic unmarried women
1995 71.0 74.5 28.1
2006 71.4 70.7 32.4
2013 64.7 61.7 31.7
Source: Copen et al. (2013) and Martin et al. (2015)
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cohabiting and never married – women, was apparently the decisive factor in the 
recent rise of black childlessness.
8.6  Epilogue
More than ever in U.S. history, women and couples can regulate their fertility. They 
have access to a wide variety of means to prevent childbearing, and there is over 
20 years of experience with assisted reproductive technologies (ART) which can 
alleviate the burden of infertility. A Division of Reproductive Health at the Centers 
for Disease Control has a long history of surveillance and research in women’s 
health and fertility, adolescent reproductive health, and safe motherhood. In response 
to a congressional mandate, CDC has started to strengthen existing data collection 
efforts initiated by the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) and 
the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART), and to develop a national 
system for monitoring ART use and outcomes.
The facts, i.e. the childlessness levels and trends since the late nineteenth cen-
tury, are reasonably well known. But often the mechanisms that shaped the facts 
have not been thoroughly deciphered, although some of the basic circumstances 
affecting levels and trends of childlessness are quite obvious, namely the concurrent 
economic and social conditions and cultural norms.
The U.S. population has experienced periods of very high and very low child-
lessness. The challenging living conditions in the 1930s appear to have been the 
main cause of the high levels of childlessness observed in that period. In contrast, 
the favorable living standards and enlightened public policies of the 1940s, 1950s, 
and 1960s were instrumental in maintaining low levels of childlessness.
Living conditions of African Americans were far more difficult than those of 
white Americans; hence higher black than white childlessness during much of the 
twentieth century. Subsequently black childlessness declined to levels below those 
of whites which in part was likely to have been due to improvements in the health 
and living conditions of blacks, even though these conditions continued to be infe-
rior to those of whites.
In the recent past, i.e. since the 1970s through the late 1990s/early 2000s, the 
three independent sources of data indicate that the overall childlessness rate doubled 
(Figs. 8.1, 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 and Tables 8.1 and 8.2). This was the case among white 
as well as among black women, although not quite for identical birth cohorts 
(Fig. 8.2).
While history provides a general understanding of the principal causes of child-
lessness, the experience of the past few decades points to the complexity inherent in 
identifying more specific factors shaping levels and trends of childlessness. In 
Sect. 8.4 above, 15 such societal factors discussed in the literature are listed. In 
addition, people claim to have personal motivations and preferences for not having 
children. Six of the most compelling ones were also listed above. What appears 
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lacking is an overall picture of the interaction of the elements which shape child-
lessness, and how these change over time.
As of the early 2010s, around 12–16 % of U.S. white and black women over age 
40 remained childless. Among Hispanic women this share was lower, about 11 % 
were childless. Whether these percentages will increase or decline is impossible to 
predict. It depends on whether the material world will be aiding or obstructing fam-
ily formation, and how cultural norms and personal attitudes will change over time.
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